
All wireless communication stacks are equally broken


















Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany




A foundation talk???

Wireless communication is **fun**damentally broken...

...focus: everything in a **smartphone**.



Higher complexity rises chance of issues with the specification and implementation!




WIRELESS EXPLOITATION







Layers and Privileges



- Execution within a component means security measures like encryption become ineffective.
- Less interaction / more distance / harder to find / privileged component / higher market demand
 - → more expensive
- Attackers hate physical proximity!



Advanced Wireless Tooling @ SEEMOO



NFCGate

Project lead: Max Maass

Nexmon

- Project lead: Matthias Schulz
- Binary patching framework for Broadcom Wi-Fi
- 2.4 GHz software-defined radio

Qualcomm LTE

Project lead:
 Arash Asadi



InternalBlue

- Project lead: Jiska
 - **Broadcom Bluetooth**




OWL / OpenDrop

- Project lead: Milan Stute
- Open source Apple AirDrop implementation

Hackers gonna hack...

nexnon

- Google Project Zero (April 2017, Gal Beniamini)
- Broadpwn (July 2017, Nitay Artenstein)
- Quarkslab (April 2019, Hugues Anguelkov)





 Demonstration of the KNOB attack on Bluetooth key negotiation (August 2019, Daniele Antonioli et. al.)





- Honeypots @ Black Hat
- AirDos (December 2019, Kishan Bagaria)

NEAD FIELD COMMUNICATION






- Wireless signals travel with speed of light, distance bounding is possible.
- NFC applications usually do not check any time constraints.
- Lab project:
 - Forward communication of an NFC-based payment system.
 - Vulnerable to relays and even modification of messages in some cases.
- Solution:
 - 3rd parties asked our students to stop testing :)

Near Field Communication


VISA ...

... specification compliant fraud \o/

Other 3rd parties continued analyzing NFC security.



BLUETOOTH CHIP REMOTE CODE EXECUTION







Code Execution on a Bluetooth Chip

- Request the encryption keys for any MAC address.
 - Specification compliant request: HCI_Link_Key_Request.
 - Impersonate devices, overhear encrypted communication, ...
 - → Break Android **Smart Lock** and similar features!

LAST TIME I UPDATED BLUETOOTH IN MY CAR?





Note: Bluetooth connections have a range of up to 100 meters.

Your Bluetooth watchYour car's Bluetooth system

More possibilities to escalate into other components.

Exploit Persistence

 Broadcom/Cypress chips only flush queues, connections, etc. upon reset.

No full hardware reset.

- Many operating systems will only issue a HCI_Reset command.
- **Flight mode** might hard reset the chip.
- **Reboot** might hard reset the chip.

(Coexistence behavior sometimes persists...)

 Turning off your smartphone will hard reset the chip. BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.1 | Vol 2, Part E

page 954

Host Controller Interface Functional Specification




7.3.2 Reset command

Command	OCF	Command Parameters	Return Parameters
HCI_Reset	0x0003		Status

Description:

The HCI_Reset comn BR/EDR Controller, the Controller. If the Controller command shall reset HCI_Reset command HCI transport layers resis completed, the current standby mode and the for the parameters for




the Link Manager on the the Link Layer on an LE LE then the HCI_Reset Link Layer. The nsport layer since the neir own. After the reset the Controller will enter rert to the default values Link the specification.

Note: The HCI_Reset command will not necessarily perform a hardware reset. This is implementation defined.



Frankenstein



Emulate Bluetooth firmware with the same speed as in hardware for realistic **full-stack fuzzing**.

- The Linux host can run a full Bluetooth stack on a desktop setup.
- Add an xmit_state in hook to the Bluetooth firmware function of interest, e.g., device scanning, active connection, ...
- Reattach emulated snapshot with btattach, enter a similar state on the desktop, and start fuzzing.

DEMO!

Jan Ruge fuzzed the unfuzzable!

Fuzzinating!

Jan: Fuzzes early connection states, finds heap overflows in

basic packet types.

iPhone 11: Can you hear me? I come with Bluetooth 5.1!


Me: The connection state can be paired and encrypted, any user or app interaction is valid input, as long as I can get code execution on that chip.

... enters a more complicated state for fuzzing ...

Me: Oh noes, they misconfigured the heap on this one specific evaluation board. Fixing the heap hard-bricked one evaluation board.

... porting ~200 handwritten hooks to another evaluation board with correct heap ...

Fuzz next?



CHIP LEVEL ESCALATION

Firmware

Applications

Daemons / Subsystem


Driver

Firmware



Coexistence: Escalation within the Chip

Bluetooth / Wi-Fi Combo Chip



Francesco Gringoli and me worked on this.

Coexistence???

Francesco: I guess it's just a marketing feature.

Me: Aww it must be an exploitation feature!

... traveling to Italy for eating some gelato ...

Reality: Hard-coded blacklisting and traffic

classes for Bluetooth and Wi-Fi.

Tons of patents.


Proprietary deluxe!





Almost a Demo:)

- You can disable Wi-Fi via Bluetooth and Bluetooth via Wi-Fi.
- Sometimes requires manual reboot to get wireless stuff working again.
- Buggy driver panics some older Androids and all up-to-date iPhones.
- Broadcom says six months might be sufficient to fix firmware.
- ... but exploitation requires code execution on the Bluetooth or Wi-Fi chip.



iOS 13 Release Notes


Additional recognition

Bluetooth

We would like to acknowledge Jan Ruge of TU Darmstadt, Secure Mobile Networking Lab, Jiska Classen of TU Darmstadt, Secure Mobile Networking Lab, Francesco Gringoli of University of Brescia, Dennis Heinze of TU Darmstadt, Secure Mobile Networking Lab for their assistance.



ESCALATE ALL THE STACKS





Attacking Bluetooth Hosts

- BlueBorne: Various attacks on Android, Windows, Linux, iOS.
- ... okay but that was 2017?

If someone looked into it, it must be secure now!



- IoT gadgets, wireless headphones, fitness trackers, ...
- Apple ecosystem: Bluetooth is almost everywhere and always enabled.
- Web Bluetooth: BLE support within various browsers.

2020 might bring a couple of BlueBorne like attacks.


The Linux Bluetooth Stack

Number of commits in BlueZ:

- 23% Committer #1
- 17% Committer #2
- 15% Committer #3
- 5% Committer #4



The Apple Bluetooth Stack(s)



The Android Bluetooth Stack





Bluetooth for Bluescreens???



Sadly I couldn't find any student who wants to work on this yet.

0% complete



But if you are really into pain, consider this as a job offer for a student thesis @ SEEMOO :D

LTE*

* LONG TERM EXPLOITATION



All Assembly is Beautiful!









Simjacker and WIBAttack

- Purpose of a SIM card: **Protect sensitive key material**. (??!!)
- SIM cards can be configured remotely by your telecommunication provider.
- ... SIM cards including eSIMs ...
 - Receiving a victim's location,
 - fraud by dialing premium numbers,
 - ... launch browser.





Vulnerability with a logo!

SIM card technology from A-Z LaF0rge

- I'm a Telekom business customer, making a call to the support hotline takes less than 3 minutes.
- Phone: 13.9. 2x, 19.9., 21.9., 27.9., 1.10., 17.10.
- Mails: 3x ...
- Still no answer what is running on my SIM cards.



https://simjacker.com/

LTEFuzz

- Highly complex LTE state machines.
- Implementation failures in backends and mobile devices.

SigOver + alpha CheolJun Park, Mincheol Son

Test messages	Direction	Property 1-1	Property 1-2 (P)	Property 2-1 (I)	Property 2-2 (R)	Property 3	Affected component
NAS							
Attach request (IMSI/GUTI)	UL	В	DoS	DoS	DoS	121	Core network (MME)
Detach request (UE originating detach)	UL	-	DoS [1]	DoS	DoS	1949	Core network (MME)
Service request	UL	-	-	В	Spoofing	1050	Core network (MME)
Tracking area update request	UL	2	DoS	DoS	FLU and DoS	1/26	Core network (MME)
Uplink NAS transport	UL	-	SMS phishing and DoS	SMS phishing and DoS	SMS replay	13-3	Core network (MME)
PDN connectivity request	UL	В	В	DoS	DoS	933	Core network (MME)
PDN disconnect request	UL	-	В	DoS	selective DoS	-	Core network (MME)
Attach reject	DL	DoS [2]	DoS [3]	1-1		0 5 8	Baseband
Authentication reject	DL	DoS [4]	9	128	8	626	Baseband
Detach request (UE terminated detach)	DL	-	DoS [4]		-	1949	Baseband
EMM information	DL		Spoofing [5]	17.0		100	Baseband
GUTI reallocation command	DL	2	В	В	ID Spoofing	129	Baseband
Identity request	DL	Info. leak [6]	В	В	Info. leak	(2 4 3	Baseband
Security mode command	DL	-	В	В	Location tracking [4]	0.50	Baseband
Service reject	DL	-	DoS [3]	-	-	120	Baseband
Tracking area update reject	DL	-	DoS [3]	15 5 0	ā	959	Baseband
RRC						,	
RRCConnectionRequest	UL	DoS and con. spoofing	-	41		1942	Core network (eNB)
RRCConnectionSetupComplete	UL	Con. spoofing	-	-		15	Core network (eNB)
MasterInformationBlock	DL	Spoofing		120	2	1120	Baseband
Paging	DL	DoS [4] and Spoofing		-	-	1381	Baseband
RRCConnectionReconfiguration	DL		MitM	DoS	В	0.75	Baseband
RRCConnectionReestablishment	DL	-	Con. spoofing	(4)	-	989	Baseband
RRCConnectionReestablishmentReject	DL		DoS			0.50	Baseband
RRCConnectionReject	DL	DoS	9	1923	2	620	Baseband
RRCConnectionRelease	DL	DoS [2]	-	-	-	15#2	Baseband
RRCConnectionSetup	DL	Con. spoofing	-	-	-	1000	Baseband
SecurityModeCommand	DL	-	В	В	В	MitM	Baseband
SystemInformationBlockType1	DL	Spoofing [4]	-	-	-	-	Baseband
SystemInformationBlockType 10/11	DL	Spoofing [4]	-	-		-	Baseband
SystemInformationBlockType12	DL	Spoofing [4]	-	-		-	Baseband
UECapabilityEnquiry	DL	Info. leak	_	Info. leak	Info. leak	. . .	Baseband

https://sites.google.com/view/ltefuzz



RESPONSIBLE DISCLOSURE

Fixing the Heap

Jan:

Your heap implementation does not provide any protection against exploitation, here is how you could fix it ...

ThreadX: Our heap has already been exploited, see the following blog post.

Please note that it is up to the application to use the heap correctly.



Is the vulnerability still there?

Me: Your smartphones are still vulnerable.

Samsung: We cannot send you any patches for testing without an NDA.

Broadcom: We can send you patches in

advance for testing.

Me: Great!

Broadcom: Can you give us a list of devices?

Me: Sends detailed list, as they can

guess it from our infos anyway.

Broadcom: Before sending you the patches,

we need an NDA.

Me: LOLNOPE...



Zero day? Some dollars:)

Broadcom's PSIRT

- does not hand out CVEs, and
- not getting into legal trouble is sufficient amount of "bug bounty".


... but their customers and partners (Samsung, Apple, Cypress, ...) might still value the work of my students?

- One company which does not want to be mentioned sponsored a flight to DEF CON.
- Samsung gave a bounty of \$1000.

Responsible Disclosure Timeline

Quarkslab Responsible Disclosure Timeline for Broadcom Wi-Fi Chips

- 2018-09-13: Email sent to Broadcom detailing the vulnerabilities
- 2018-09-13: Reply from Broadcom acknowledging the report.
- 2018-09-19: Broadcom asks if Quarkslab has a communication plan for the bugs.
- 2018-09-20: Quarkslab replies it plans to publish a blog post and provides URLs to prior publications as example. Asks if Broadcom could reproduce the bugs and if they were already known to them.
- 2018-09-20: **Broadcom** replies that they have "limited ability to share our plans and findings" because there isn't a **Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA)** signed between the companies and they would be sharing non-public information.
- 2018-09-20: Quarkslab replies that it is not possible to coordinate disclosure if one of the involved parties -the reporter-I and when the vendor plans to issue fixes, and that it cannot agree to sign an NDA that would prevent reporting to custor the disclosure process was handled. Finally, Quarkslab asks if there is any information that Broadcom may provide that
- 2018-09-20: Broadcom asks if there is a date set for the publication.
- 2018-09-20: Reply indicating the date is not set and it is not entirely dependent on Quarkslab.
- 2018-10-28: Email set to CERT/CC asking for help to coordinate with Broadcom (since it is a US-based vendor) given the
 details about the bugs and a brief timeline of previous communications is provided.




Responsible Disclosure Timeline

- 2018-10-30: CERT/CC reply asking for further details such as list of vulnerable devices, proof-of-concept program and the planned date of publication.
- 2018-10-30: Quarkslab replies pointing to page 2 of the report which lists versions of firmware confirmed vulnerable. Indicates that PoC is not available at the moment but may be sent the following week and that the publication date is not set, and that both things may not be easy to do since they also depend on availability of a former intern.
- 2018-11-01: Email from Apple saying that Broadcom shared Quarkslab's report with them, they are investigating one of the vulnerabilities and would like to coordinate disclosure. Asks if disclosure date has been set.
- 2018-11-06: Reply from Quarkslab informing Apple that CERT/CC is on the loop as well, explains that Broadcom said it will not provide information unless an NDA is signed, and that the
 - publication date is not set but would likely be before the end of the year. Quarkslab asks if a CVE
- 2018-11-13: Apple replies that a CVE ID will be assigned closer to patch release date and that the
- 2019-01-09: Email from CERT/CC requesting a status update
- 2019-01-10: Reply saying that Quarkslab has not received any communication from Broadcom sir
 CERT/CC has any news.
- 2019-03-08: Email to CERT/CC asking if there are any news.
- 2019-03-26: CERT/CC replies that it received a response from Broadcom that did not confirm nor
 2019. CERT/CC asks Quarkslab if there is any new information.
- 2019-03-28: Apple informs they will be releasing a patch on April 14th, 2019 and asks if Quarkslat
- 2019-04-08: Quarkslab sends mail to Apple and CERT/CC asking if the fix will be for one or more
 Linux kernel driver on February 14th, 2019 without a CVE ID nor a security notice, and asks if App



Responsible Disclosure Timeline

- 2019-04-08: Quarkslab sends mail to Apple and CERT/CC asking if the fix will be for one or more vulnerabilities. Points out that **Broadcom committed a fix** to a bug in their open source **Linux kernel** driver on February 14th, 2019 without a CVE ID nor a security notice, and asks if Apple will be fixing the same bug.
- 2019-04-08: CERT/CC asks for permission to send a general notification that includes the report originally sent by Quarkslab in September 2018, says it will assign CVE IDs and that it is drafting a security note that will send for comments.
- 2019-04-08: Quarkslab agrees to have the vulnerability report disseminated.
- 2019-04-10: CERT/CC sends draft vulnerability note and asks if any of the heap overflows could result in code execution. Also asks for URL to Quarkslab blog post.
- 2019-04-11: Apple sends CVE ID and draft of paragraph describing their bugfix. States they are fixing a bug different than the one Broadcom patched in the brcmfmac Linux kernel driver
- 2019-04-12: Quarkslab replies that the GTK bugs could result in remote code execution either on the Linux kernel or on the
 FullMAC). Remote heap layout manipulation is very complicated but RCE should not be discarded as worst case scenario
 Quarkslab will provide publication URL on the week of April 14th.
- 2019-04-12: Apple asks for draft of our blog post. Quarkslab replies that is not yet ready.
- 2019-04-12: CERT/CC sends update vulnerability note with summary description of each vuln and assigned CVE IDs. Poi another bug that was described in the report Quarkslab sent in September 2018. The original response from the vendor in though they apparently later supplied patches), and they would not provide information about the wl driver.
- 2019-04-15: CERT/CC asks if Quarkslab will publish on this date. Corrects one of the CVE IDs previously provided.
- 2019-04-15: Quarkslab replies that blog post will very likely go live on the 16th.
- 2019-04-15: Apple sends link to Security Update 2019-002 that fixes CVE-2019-8564
- 2019-04-16: This blog post is published.



Is this just Broadcom?

- **Cypress** (who acquired Broadcom IoT and is now acquired by Infineon) also has very slow response times.
- ... people told me **Qualcomm** responsible disclosure timelines are even worse.
- Luckily we didn't find something in an Intel CPU;)
- And there are so many other vendors to become friends with :)






PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS

Hope: The Secure Wi-Fi Setup



The Air-Gapped Device



ASK ALL THE QUESTIONS

iii 555





